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Phasing out distortionary government subsidies and barriers to international trade will 
yield extraordinarily high benefits relative to any adjustment costs, notwithstanding 
the considerable reforms that have already taken place over the past two decades. This 
paper surveys recent estimates, using global economy-wide simulation models, of the 
benefits of reducing remaining distortions via unilateral reform, multilateral trade 
negotiations, and preferential trading arrangements. Distortionary trade policies harm 
most the economies imposing them, but the worst of them (in agriculture and 
clothing) are particularly harmful to the world’s poorest people. Opportunities to 
reduce remaining distortions, including via the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda as 
compared with sub-global preferential reform, are examined, before drawing out the 
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Despite the net economic and social benefits of reducing most government subsidies
1 
and opening economies to trade, almost every national government intervenes in 
markets for goods and services in ways that distort international commerce. Those 
interventions have been reduced considerably over the past two decades (the exports-
to-GDP ratio rose globally by about one-third), but many remain. Distortionary 
policies harm most the economies imposing them, but the worst of them (in 
agriculture and clothing) are particularly harmful to the world’s poorest people. This 
paper focuses on how wasteful those anti-poor policies are, as measured in recent 
modelling exercises; what could be done to induce countries to reduce remaining 
distortions, including via the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as compared with sub-global preferential reform; and what 
impact that reform could have on poverty and the environment.  
This challenge in its modern form has been with us for about 75 years. The 
latter part of the nineteenth century saw a strong movement toward laissez faire, but 
that development was reversed following the first world war in ways that led to the 
Great Depression of the early 1930s and the conflict that followed (Kindleberger 
1989). It was during the second world war, in 1944, that a conference at Bretton 
Woods proposed an International Trade Organization. An ITO charter was drawn up 
by 1948 along with a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but the ITO 
idea died when the United States failed to progress it through Congress (Diebold 
1952). Despite that, the GATT during its 47-year history (before it was absorbed into 
the WTO on 1 January 1995) oversaw the gradual lowering of many tariffs on imports 
of most manufactured goods by governments of developed countries. Manufacturing 
tariffs remained high in developing countries, however, and distortionary subsidies 
and trade policies affecting agricultural, textile, and services markets of both rich and 
poor countries continued to hamper efficient resource allocation, economic growth 
and poverty alleviation.  
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations led to agreements 
signed in 1994 that contributed to trade liberalization over the subsequent 10 years. 
But even when those agreements are fully implemented by early 2005, and despite 
additional unilateral trade liberalizations since the 1980s by a number of countries 
(particularly developing and transition economies), many subsidies and trade 
distortions remain. They include not just trade taxes-cum-subsidies but also 
contingent protection measures such as anti-dumping, regulatory standards that can be 
technical barriers to trade, and domestic production subsidies (allegedly decoupled in 
the case of some farm support programs in rich countries but in fact only partially so). 
Insufficient or excessive taxation or quantitative regulations in the presence of 
externalities such as environmental or food safety risks also lead to inefficiencies and 
can be trade distorting. Furthermore, the on-going proliferation of preferential trading 
                                                 
1 Not all subsidies are welfare-reducing, and in some cases a subsidy-cum-tax will be optimal to 
overcome a gap between private and social costs that cannot be bridged à la Coase (1960). Throughout 
this paper all references to ‘cutting subsidies’ refer to bringing them back to their optimal level (which 





and bilateral or regional integration arrangements – for which there would be little or 
no need in the absence of trade barriers – is adding complexity to international 
economic relations. In some cases those arrangements are leading to trade and 
investment diversion rather than creation that may even be welfare reducing for some 
economies. 
  The reluctance to reduce trade distortions is almost never because such policy 
reform involves government treasury outlays. On the contrary, except in the case of a 
handful of low-income countries still heavily dependent on trade taxes for 
government revenue, such reform may well benefit the treasury (by raising income 
and/or consumption tax revenues more than trade tax revenues fall, not to mention 
any payments foregone because of cuts to subsidy programs). Rather, distortions 
remain largely because further trade liberalization and subsidy would cut redistribute 
jobs, income and wealth in ways that those in government fear would reduce their 
chances of remaining in power (and possibly their own wealth in countries where 
corruption is rife). The challenge involves finding politically attractive ways to phase 
out remaining distortions to world markets for goods, services, capital and potentially 
even labor.  
This paper focuses primarily on distortions at national borders (trade taxes and 
subsidies, quantitative restrictions on international trade, and technical barriers to 
trade) plus a few significantly trade-distorting production subsidies. While global in 
coverage, the paper distinguishes between policies of developed countries and those 
of developing (including former socialist and least-developed) countries. Among 
other things, it emphasizes the likely consequences for the UN’s key Millennium 
Development Goals. 
The paper begins by summarizing the arguments for removing trade 
distortions, along with critiques by sceptics. This involves examining not only the 
economic benefits, and costs, but also the social and environmental consequences of 
such reform. Opportunities to reduce these distortions over the next five years are then 
laid out. They are, in decreasing order of potential contribution to global openness and 
economic growth: full trade liberalization globally (to provide more a benchmark than 
a politically likely scenario), non-preferential legally binding trade liberalization 
following the WTO’s current round of multilateral trade negotiations (the Doha 
Development Agenda), a reciprocal preferential agreement in the form of a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and a non-reciprocal preferential agreement by 
OECD countries to provide least-developed countries with duty-free and quota-free 
market access for their exports of everything but arms (EBA). Estimates of the 
economic benefits and costs of these opportunities are then presented, along with a 
methodological critique of the various empirical studies surveyed. The paper 
concludes with a brief assessment of possible impacts of trade reform on poverty 
alleviation and the natural environment.  
 
 
Arguments for Removing Trade Barriers 
 
Even before examining the empirical estimates of the costs and benefits from grasping 
various trade-liberalizing opportunities, the case can be made that such reform in 
principle is beneficial economically. It then remains to examine whether particular 
reforms are also at least benign in terms of social and environmental outcomes. The 





assume the social and/or environmental consequences are adverse and seek to 
persuade others through such means as mass (and sometimes violent) street protests. 
 
Static economic gains from own-country reform 
 
The standard comparative static analysis of national gains from international trade 
emphasises the economic benefits from production specialization and exchange so as 
to exploit comparative advantage in situations where a nation’s costs of production 
and/or preferences differ from those in the rest of the world. This is part of the more 
general theory of the welfare effects of distortions in a trading economy, as 
summarized by Bhagwati (1971). Domestic industries become more productive as 
those with a comparative advantage expand by drawing resources from those 
previously protected or subsidized industries that grow slower or contract following 
reform. 
The static gains from trade tend to be greater as a share of national output the 
smaller the economy, particularly where economies of scale in production have not 
been fully exploited and where consumers (including firms importing intermediate 
inputs) value variety so that intra- as well as inter-industry trade can flourish.
2 In such 
cases the more-efficient firms within expanding industries tend to take over the less 
efficient ones. Indeed theory and empirical studies suggest the shifting of resources 
within an industry may be more welfare-improving than shifts between industries.
3 
They are also greater the more trade barriers have allowed imperfect competition to 
prevail in the domestic marketplace, which again is more common in smaller 
economies where industries have commensurately smaller numbers of firms. 
 
Dynamic economic gains from own-country reform 
 
To the standard comparative static analysis needs to be added links between trade and 
economic growth. The mechanisms by which openness contributes to growth are 
gradually getting to be better understood by economists, thanks to the pioneering 
work of such theorists as Grossman and Helpman (1991), Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
(1991) and the literature those studies spawned. Channels through which openness to 
trade can affect an economy’s growth rate include the scale of the market when 
knowledge is embodied in the products traded, the degree of redundant knowledge 
creation that is avoided through openness (Romer 1994), and the effect of knowledge 
spillovers (Taylor 1999).
4 More importantly from a policy maker’s viewpoint, the 
                                                 
2 Some may question the value of intra-industry trade, given that transaction costs such as freight can 
be non-trivial. However, if consumers (including producers using those products as intermediate 
inputs) are willing to pay for a greater variety of products, it would be welfare reducing to prevent 
them. Feenstra et al. (1992) suggest the welfare cost of tariff protection can be underestimated by as 
much as a factor of ten when this consideration is not included. In a study of US import data from 1972 
to 2001, Broda and Weinstein (2004) find that the upward bias in the conventional import price index, 
because of not accounting for the growth in varieties of products, is approximately 1.2 percent per year, 
and estimate that the welfare gain from variety growth in US imports alone is 2.8 percent of GDP. 
 
3 See Melitz (1999) on the theory of this point and Trefler (2001) for an empirical illustration.  
4 Openness allows society’s knowledge capital to grow faster. If an x percent increase in that stock 
generates an increase of more than x percent in individual firms’ outputs, as assumed by Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (2002), then that economy’s GDP growth rate will rise. A recent study of North-South trade 





available empirical evidence strongly supports the view that open economies grow 
faster (see the survey by USITC 1997).  
Notable econometric studies of the linkage between trade reform and the rate 
of economic growth include those by Sachs and Warner (1995) and Frankel and 
Romer (1999). More-recent studies also provide some indirect supportive econometric 
evidence. For example, freeing up the importation of intermediate and capital goods 
promotes investments that increase growth (Wacziarg 2001). Indeed, the higher the 
ratio of imported to domestically produced capital goods for a developing country, the 
faster it grows (Lee 1995; Mazumdar 2001).  
Rodrigeuz and Rodrik (2001) examine a number of such studies and claim the 
results they surveyed are not robust. However, in a more recent study that revisits the 
Sachs and Warner data and then provides new time-series evidence, Wacziarg and 
Welch (2003) show that dates of trade liberalization do characterize breaks in 
investment and GDP growth rates. Specifically, for the 1950-1998 period, countries 
that have liberalized their trade (raising their trade-to-GDP ratio by an average of 5 
percentage points) have enjoyed on average 1.5 percentage points higher GDP growth 
compared with their pre-reform rate.  
There have also been myriad case studies of liberalization episodes. In a 
survey of 36 of them, Greenaway (1993) reminds us that many things in addition to 
trade policies were changing during the studied cases, so ascribing causality is not 
easy. That, together with some econometric studies that fail to find that positive link, 
has led Freeman (2004) to suggest the promise of raising the rate of economic growth 
through trade reform has been overstated. But the same could be (and has been) said 
about the contributions to growth of such things as investments in education, health, 
agricultural research, and so on (Easterly 2001). A more-general and more-robust 
conclusion that Easterly draws from empirical evidence, though, is that people 
respond to incentives. Hence getting incentives right in factor and product markets is 
crucial – and removing unwarranted subsidies and trade barriers is an important part 
of that process. Additional evidence from 13 new case studies reported in Wacziarg 
and Welch (2003) adds further empirical support to that view, as does the fact that 
there are no examples of autarkic economies that have enjoyed sustained economic 
growth, in contrast to the many examples since the 1960s of reformed economies that 
boomed after opening up. 
Specifically, economies that commit to less market intervention tend to attract 
more investment funds, ceteris paribus, which raise their stocks of capital (through 
greater aggregate global savings or at the expense of other economies’ capital stocks). 
This is consistent with the findings by Faini (2004) that trade liberalization in the 
1990s fostered inward foreign investment (and both had a positive impact on 
investment in education) while backtracking on trade reform had a negative impact on 
foreign investment. More-open economies also tend to be more innovative, because of 
greater trade in intellectual capital (information, ideas and technologies, sometimes 
but not only in the form of purchasable intellectual property). Trade liberalization can 
thereby lead not just to a larger capital stock and a one-off increase in productivity but 
also to higher rates of capital accumulation and productivity growth in the reforming 
economy because of the way reform energizes entrepreneurs. For those higher growth 
rates to be sustained, though, there is widespread agreement that governments also 
need to (a) have in place effective institutions to efficiently allocate and protect 
property rights, (b) allow domestic factor and product markets to function freely, and 





Welch 2003; Baldwin 2004). Or to paraphrase Panagariya (2004), trade openness is 
necessary, but may not be a sufficient condition, for sustained economic growth. 
 
 
What Could Induce Countries to Reform? 
 
Despite the evident economic gains from removing trade distortions, most countries 
retain protection from foreign competition for at least some of their industries. 
Numerous reasons have been suggested as to why a country imposes trade barriers in 
the first place (infant industry assistance, unemployment prevention, balance of 
payments maintenance, tax revenue raising, protection of environmental or labor 
standards, etc.). All of them are found wanting in almost all circumstances, in the 
sense that a lower-cost domestic policy instrument is available to meet each of those 
objectives (Corden 1997; Bhagwati 1988). Nonetheless, there are well-meaning 
people who still believe trade measures are needed for one or other of those reasons, 
or to avoid the social costs associated with removing them.
5 So part of the present 
challenge is to convince such people that the gains from reform would far exceed the 
costs and that there are more-direct means of addressing their concerns.  
The more difficult part of reforming trade policies relates to the fact that the 
most compelling explanation for their persistence is a political economy one. The 
changes in product prices that result from trade liberalization or subsidy cuts 
necessarily change the prices for the services of productive factors such as land, labor 
and capital. Hence even though the aggregate income and wealth of a nation may be 
expected to grow when trade distortions are reduced, not everyone need gain; and 
social safety nets, where they exist, typically provide only partial compensation for 
such losses. This is the source of resistance to policy reforms: the expected losses in 
jobs, income and wealth are concentrated in the hands of a few who are prepared to 
support politicians who resist protection cuts, while the gains are sufficiently small 
per consumer and export firm and are distributed sufficiently widely as to make it not 
worthwhile for those potential gainers (not to mention foreign producers/exporters) to 
get together to lobby for reform, particularly given their greater free-rider problem in 
acting collectively (Hillman 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994). Thus the observed 
pattern of protection in a country at a point in time may well be an equilibrium 
outcome in a national political market for policy intervention. In that case reform 
requires a shock to that equilibrium. 
That political market equilibrium may be altered from time to time. Changes 
are induced by such things as better information dissemination, technological 
changes, reforms abroad, and new opportunities to join international trade 
agreements. 
 
                                                 
5 Trade liberalization in recent years has attracted a considerable amount of attention of civil society 
groups, who see it contributing to the spread of capitalism and in particular of multinational firms, and 
believe those aspects of globalization add social and environmental ills in both rich and poor countries 
(Bhagwati 2004; Wolf 2004). But just as the traditional economic arguments for protection have been 
found wanting, so too have the social and environmental ones both conceptually and empirically. For 
example, there has not been a systematic ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental or labor standards of 
rich countries as a result of trade and foreign direct investment growth, and in poor countries foreign 
corporations often have among the highest environmental and labor standards (Bhagwati and Hudec 
1996). Nor has trade growth been a major contributor to the stagnation of wages of unskilled workers 





Better information dissemination  
 
One way that political markets for policy intervention change is better dissemination 
(e.g., by national or international bureaucrats, think tanks, local export industries, 
foreign import suppliers) of more-convincing information on the benefits to 
consumers, exporters and the overall economy from reducing subsidies and trade 
distortions, and on alternative means of achieving society’s other objectives more 
efficiently, so as to balance the views of single-issue non-government organizations 
(NGOs), labor unions and the like who tend to focus only on the (often exaggerated) 
costs of reform to their constituents. 
During the past two decades the spreading of more balanced benefit/cost 
information has contributed to unilateral economic reforms and a consequent opening 
to trade in numerous developing countries as well as richer countries such as Australia 
and New Zealand. More recently several major NGOs, together with the OECD 
Secretariat, have begun to focus on providing better information about the 
wastefulness of environmentally harmful subsidies, and that has already started to 
have an impact (e.g. in reducing coal mining subsidies in Europe). 
 
Technological change  
 
Another way the political equilibrium is altered is technological innovation. The 
information and telecommunications revolution of the past two decades, for example, 
has dramatically lowered the costs of doing business across national borders, just as 
happened with the arrival of steamships and the telegraph during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. That increased trading opportunity has made (actual or potential) 
exporters more eager to get together to counter the anti-trade lobbying of import-
protected groups and NGOs. 
 
Unilateral opening of markets abroad  
 
A country’s political equilibrium could be upset also by trade opening by one or more 
other countries, in so far as those reforms alter international prices and volumes of 
trade and foreign investment and provide greater market access opportunities for 
current or prospective exporters. Such opening abroad also adds to the evidence of the 
net gains and (particularly in the case of phased reforms) the relatively low 
adjustment costs associated with trade reform, making it easier for exporters to 
counter the alarmist lobbying of protectionists.  
A coincidence of this and the previous two types of shocks has given rise to 
the latest wave of globalization. This is raising not only the rewards to economies 
practicing good economic governance but also the cost of retaining poor economic 
governance. Just as financial capital can now flow into a well-managed economy 
more easily and quickly than ever before, so it can equally quickly be withdrawn if 
confidence in that economy’s governance is shaken – as the East Asian financial crisis 
of the late 1990s demonstrated all too clearly. A crucial element of good economic 
governance is a commitment to a permanently open international trade and payments 
regime (along with sound domestic policies such as an absence of subsidies, secure 
property rights and prudent monetary and fiscal policies).  
 






In seeking to find politically expedient ways to open their economies, governments 
are increasingly looking for opportunities to do so bilaterally, regionally or 
multilaterally. The reason is that the political market equilibrium in two or more 
countries can be altered in favor of liberalism through an exchange of product market 
access. If country A allows more imports, it may well harm its import-competing 
producers if there are insufficient compensation mechanisms; but if this liberalization 
is done in return for country A’s trading partners lowering their barriers to A’s 
exports, the producers of those exports will be better off. The latter extra benefit may 
be sufficiently greater than the loss to A’s import-competing producers that A’s 
liberalizing politicians too become net gainers in terms of electoral, financial or other 
support in return for negotiating an international trade agreement. When politicians in 
the countries trading with A also see the possibility for gaining from such an 
exchange of market access, for equal and opposite reasons, prospects for trade 
negotiations are ripe.
6 Such gains from trade negotiations involving exchange of 
market access are potentially greater nationally and globally, the larger the number of 
countries involved and the broader the product and issues coverage of the 
negotiations. That is the logic behind negotiating multilaterally with nearly 150 WTO 
member countries over a wide range of sectors and issues.  
The WTO negotiating process is becoming increasingly cumbersome, 
however, which has led countries also to negotiate bilaterally or regionally in the hope 
that faster and deeper integration will result. Preferential free trade areas involving 
just a subset of countries need not be welfare-enhancing for all participant nations, 
however, in part because of trade diversion away from the lowest-cost supplier; and 
non-participants in the rest of the world may be made worse off too (Pomfret 1997; 
Schiff and Winters 2003). Hence the need for empirical analysis of the likely gains 
from different types of prospective trade agreements. 
 
 
Opportunities for Reducing Subsidies and Trade Barriers 
 
The gains from reducing government interventions in markets have been well known 
since the writing of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations more than two centuries ago, 
and popular magazines such as The Economist and more and more daily newspapers 
continue to remind the public of the virtues of market opening.
7 Even so, greater 
dissemination of empirical information on the net economic benefits of reducing trade 
distortions, to balance the often-exaggerated claims by potential losers and their 
supporters of the adjustment costs of reform, can no doubt assist the liberalization 
process. Empirical studies can also shed better light and take some of the heat out of 
debates about whether, in the presence of domestic distortions such as undertaxed 
pollution, subsidy and trade reform is welfare-reducing. Such studies can also point to 
the domestic policy reforms that should accompany trade reform so as to guarantee 
not only national welfare improvement in aggregate but also that there is no 
significant left-behind group, no unexpected new damage to the environment, etc. 
Clearly there is an opportunity for well-meaning interest groups, think tanks and 
                                                 
6 Elaborations of this economists’ perspective can be found in Grossman and Helpman (1995), Hillman 
and Moser (1996), Maggi and Rodrigeuz-Clare (1998), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) and Ethier 
(2004). Political scientists take a similar view. See, for example, Goldstein (1998). 
7 On the intellectual history of the virtues of free trade, see Bhagwati (1988, Ch. 2) and Irwin (1996). 
Bhagwati notes that the virtues of division of labour and exchange were cited twenty four centuries ago 





national and international economic agencies to spend more money and resources on 
such empirical studies, and in particular on the effective dissemination of their 
findings. In an idealistic world in which such studies were able to persuade all 
governments to fully liberalize their trade unilaterally, the benefit derived from that 
opportunity would be measured by the gain from moving the world to one free of 
subsidies and trade barriers. Unlikely though such an outcome may seem in the 
foreseeable future, it provides a benchmark against which all other opportunities to 
partially meet this challenge can be measured. 
Among the more-feasible opportunities available today for encouraging trade 
negotiations to stimulate significant market opening, the most obvious is a non-
preferential legally binding partial trade liberalization following the WTO’s current 
round of multilateral trade negotiations. That round was launched in Doha, the capital 
of Qatar, in 2001 with the intention of completing negotiations at the end of 2004, 
when implementation of the last of the Uruguay Round commitments under WTO are 
scheduled to be completed. That deadline has since slipped, and it is uncertain as to 
how long the current round will take, what issues will be kept on its agenda, and 
indeed even whether it will come to a successful conclusion. That uncertainty is all 
the more reason for assessing the potential of this opportunity, given that it involves 
almost 150 WTO member countries plus another 25 in the midst of accession, and 
hence all but a tiny fraction of global trade. 
There are at least three other types of trade negotiating opportunities that, 
while they involve only a subset of the world’s economies, have the potential to 
generate deeper integration in the medium term and so are worth comparing to the 
WTO Doha round. One is non-preferential but non-binding trade liberalization, as 
currently being pursued by the Pacific rim members of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum. APEC member countries agreed in 1994, and have since 
reiterated that commitment several times, to move to free trade in the Asia Pacific 
region by 2010 in the case of developed countries and 2020 in the case of developing 
countries. Even though there is no legal binding on members to achieve that goal and 
retain that status beyond the deadline, the distinguishing feature of this long-term 
commitment is that, as with WTO commitments, the market opening is to be provided 
to all trading partners of each APEC country (a most-favoured-nation or MFN reform) 
and not just to other APEC members as in a free trade agreement (FTA). That makes 
its effects simply a subset of those derived from moving to global free trade. 
A second type of trade negotiating opportunity involving a subset of the 
world’s economies is a reciprocal preferential agreement. This could take the form of 
an FTA, a customs union, or a broader economic union. Typically such an agreement 
would be legally binding and, even though it would be notified to the WTO, it would 
provide greater market access only to signatories to that agreement and hence would 
not be MFN. An example is the agreement to enlarge the European Union from 15 to 
25 members from May 2004. Efforts are also being made to negotiate a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), which potentially would bring together all the 
economies of North, Central and South America. This is by far the largest and most 
ambitious preferential agreement currently in prospect: it dwarfs the bilateral FTA 
negotiations the US and EU are each having with a range of other countries, and it is 
also more advanced than other proposed FTAs such as in South Asia and between 
China and Southeast Asia. Hence the FTAA provides an upper limit on the gains that 
might be expected from this type of prospective trade agreement. 
There is also the opportunity to enter into non-reciprocal preferential trade 





of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) and as most OECD countries have with 
developing countries in the form of a Generalized System of tariff Preferences (GSP). 
The EU’s recent initiative to extend preferences for UN-designated ‘least developed 
countries’ (LDCs) provides duty- and quota-free access to the EU for exports of 
‘everything but arms’ (EBA). It received in-principle, best-endeavours endorsement 
by other OECD countries at the WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, but 
without any specific timetable. While this opportunity clearly involves only a small 
volume of global trade, it has a relatively high probability of being implemented 
unilaterally by numerous countries and is perceived to be of direct benefit to the 
world’s poorest people – even though that view may be misplaced (see below). 
 
 
Economic Benefits From Reducing Subsidies and Trade Barriers  
 
Various attempts have been made to estimate the benefits and costs associated with 
the opportunities just outlined. All of the estimates of the potential global economic 
welfare gains from these opportunities considered here are generated using 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of the global economy, the most 
common of which is known as GTAP.
8 The CGE welfare gains refer to the equivalent 
variation in income (EV) as a result of each of the shocks described.
9 While not 
without their shortcomings (see Francois 2000, Whalley 2000, Anderson 2003), CGE 
models are far superior for current purposes to partial equilibrium models, which fail 
to capture the economy-wide nature of the adjustments to reform whereby some 
sectors expand when others contract and release capital and labor; and they are also 
superior to macro-econometric models which typically lack sufficient sectoral detail 
(Francois and Reinert 1997). They were first used in multilateral trade reform analysis 
in ex post assessments of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in the late 
1970s/early 1980s (Cline et al. 1978; Deardorff and Stern 1979, 1986; Whalley 1985). 
Since then they have been used increasingly during and following the Uruguay 
Round, as shown, for example, in the various studies summarized in Martin and 
Winters (1996). 
Empirical comparative static studies of the economic welfare gains from 
multilateral trade liberalization typically generate positive gains for the world and for 
most participating countries. (Exceptions are when a country’s welfare is reduced 
more by a terms of trade change or reduced rents from preferential market access than 
it is boosted by improvements due to reallocating its resources away from protected 
industries.) When economies of scale and monopolistic competition (IRS/MC) are 
assumed instead of constant returns to scale and perfect competition (CRS/PC), and 
when trade in not just goods but also services is liberalized, the estimates of potential 
                                                 
8 On the GTAP model and database see Hertel (1997) and www.gtap.org. Estimating the height of trade 
barriers for that database is a non-trivial task in itself, even for merchandise (Evans 2003) but 
especially for services (Findlay and Warren 2001) and if technical barriers to trade are involved 
(Maskus and Wilson 2001). Most of the studies surveyed here use the GTAP database for protection 
estimates, but virtually none of the export taxes that are still imposed by numerous low-income 
countries (see e.g. Thiele (2003) regarding beverage and cotton crops in Africa) are included in that 
database. The reason is that estimates of those taxes are not yet sufficiently comprehensive.  
9 EV is defined as the income that consumers would be willing to forego and still have the same level 
of well-being after as before the reform. For a discussion of the merits of EV versus other measures of 






gains can be increased several fold. A few economists have also examined the effects 
of lowering barriers to international capital flows or labor movements, and some have 
included estimates of a lowering of trade costs as a result of trade facilitation 
measures such as streamlining customs-clearance procedures. Even so, in most studies 
the sum of these comparative static CGE model estimates tends to amount to only a 
tiny fraction of GDP. 
Those low estimated gains seem to fly in the face of casual empiricism. Irwin 
(2002), for example, notes that three different countries on three continents chose to 
liberalize in three different decades, and per capita GDP growth in each of those 
countries accelerated markedly thereafter (Korea from 1965, Chile from 1974 and 
India from 1991 – see Irwin 2002, Figures 2.3 to 2.5). Certainly those historical 
liberalization experiences involved also complementary reforms to other domestic 
policies and institutions that would have contributed significantly to the observed 
boosts in economic growth. Even so, as mentioned above, both theoretical economists 
and econometricians have sought to demonstrate that trade can promote not only static 
efficiency gains but also dynamic gains. Some CGE modellers have tried to proxy that 
effect by adding an additional one-off total factor productivity shock to their trade 
reform scenarios. But reform may also raise the rate of factor productivity growth 
and/or of capital accumulation (Lumenga-Neso, Olarreaga and Schiff 2004). Such 
endogenous growth has yet to be satisfactorily introduced into CGE models,
10 and in 
any case it is unclear how to interpret a model’s estimated welfare effects if 
households are reducing current consumption in order to boost their or their 
descendents’ future consumption by investing more. 
It should be kept in mind that all the experiments in the comparative static 
CGE studies surveyed below reduce only trade barriers plus agricultural production 
and export subsidies. The reasons for including subsidies only in agriculture are that 
they are the key subsidies explicitly being negotiated at the WTO (where non-
agricultural export subsidies are illegal),
11 they represented an estimated 38 percent of 
all government expenditure on subsidies globally during 1994-98,
12 and they are fully 
represented in the GTAP database whereas subsidies for most other sectors are not 
included so it is not possible to estimate their welfare cost within the same 
framework. And the reason for not also explicitly estimating the welfare impacts of 
other domestic policies and institutions that, because of their complementarity, affect 
the payoff from opening up is that typically they are beyond the sphere of influence of 
international trade negotiators.  
With this as background, consider first the economic benefits associated with 
removing all trade barriers and agricultural subsidies. Only a few CGE modelling 
studies have reported simulations of complete liberalization. The ones of most 
relevance are those that incorporate in their baseline the implementation of all the 
                                                 
10 For an early attempt to develop a dynamic version of the GTAP model, see Ianchovichina and 
McDougall (2000).  
11 Production subsidies in non-agricultural sectors, however, have come under close scrutiny through 
the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures since the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures came into force with the WTO’s formation in 1995 (Bagwell and Staiger 
2004). Also, fisheries subsidies are explicitly under consideration by negotiators in the WTO’s Doha 
round. 
12 See van Beers and de Moor (2001, Table 3.1), whose estimates suggest energy subsidies are the next 
biggest group, at 22 percent of all subsidies, followed closely by road transport (21 percent) and then 
water (6 percent), forestry and mining (each 3 percent) and fisheries (2 percent), with manufacturing 
subsidies making up the residual 5 percent. For more details on energy and transport subsidies, see 





Uruguay Round agreements, since that process is due for completion at the end of 
2004. Their results are reported in Table 1. 
The ADFHHM study (Anderson et al. 2001) provides the simplest scenario: 
global liberalization of just merchandise trade using a comparative static version of 
the GTAP model with constant returns to scale and perfect competition in all product 
and factor markets (first described in Hertel 1997). The GTAP Version 4 database 
(McDougall, Elberhnri and Truong 1998), which provides data for 1995, is used in 
that study to generate a new baseline for 2005 by projecting the world economy 
forward a decade and assuming all Uruguay Round commitments (including the 
politically sensitive Agreement on Textiles and Clothing) and those of China and 
Taiwan (made on their accession to the WTO) are implemented by then. This baseline 
for 2005 is then compared with how it would look after full adjustment following the 
removal of all countries’ trade barriers and agricultural subsidies. The economic 
welfare gain is estimated to be US$254 billion per year in 1995 dollars as of 2005 
(and hence slightly more each year thereafter as the global economy expands). Of 
that, $108 billion p.a. is estimated to accrue to developing countries. These are the 
lowest of the estimates summarized in Table 1. Using the decomposition algorithm 
developed by Harrison, Horridge and Pearson (2000), Table 2 shows that only two-
fifths of this study’s estimated gain to developing countries are derived from policy 
changes in developed countries. Changes in policies in developing countries make a 
more substantial contribution to other developing countries' economic welfare, and 
almost half of that gain comes from policy changes in their agricultural sector. This 
reflects the importance not only of own-country reform but also of expanding South-
South trade. 
The BDS study (Brown, Deardorff and Stern 2003) uses the same Version 4 
GTAP data base also projected to 2005, but they embed it in the authors’ static 
Michigan Model of World Production and Trade (www.ssp.umich.edu/rsie/model and 
Deardorff and Stern 1986) to produce the highest of the surveyed estimates of global 
welfare gains from complete removal of trade barriers and agricultural subsidies: 
$2080 billion p.a., of which $431 billion would accrue to developing countries. These 
much larger estimates are the result of several features of this study: not having China 
and Taiwan’s implementation of their WTO accession commitments in the baseline; 
the inclusion of increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition (IRS/MC) 
for non-agricultural sectors and therefore product heterogeneity at the level of the firm 
rather than just the national industry; liberalization of services in addition to goods 
trade (with IRS/MC assumed for the huge services sector); and the inclusion in 
services liberalization of the opening to foreign direct investment. The latter boosts 
substantially the gains from services liberalization, which account for 63 percent or 
$1310 of this study’s estimated total gains. 
All other estimates of the gains from complete trade liberalization are between 
these two extremes. The FMT study (Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren 2003), 
which builds on Francois (2001), uses the more-recent Version 5.2 of the GTAP 
database for 1997 (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002) and a variant of the GTAP 
model to include IRS/MC (see www.intereconomics.com/francois and Francois 
1998). As in the BDS study, the latter feature ensures the inclusion of the 
agglomeration effects of reform that are emphasized in the new economic geography 
literature.
13 Its economic welfare gain is estimated to be US$367 billion per year in 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2001), Neary (2001), Fujita and Thisse (2002) and 





1997 dollars as of 1997, of which $113 billion p.a. is estimated to accrue to 
developing countries. Just over 40 percent of that total ($151 billion) is due to trade 
facilitation measures such as streamlining customs clearance,
14 while only 14 percent 
($53 billion) is due to services trade reform.
15 The global gains from removing just 
merchandise trade barriers is $163 billion in 1997 (compared with ADFHHM’s gain 
of $254 billion for 2005 when the global economy is considerably larger). Part of the 
reason for these gains being lower than those from the BDS study is that this one 
includes in its baseline China’s WTO accession, the European Union’s Agenda 2000 
and the EU’s eastern enlargement, which lowers its estimate of the gains from 
removing residual EU-25 trade barriers. But the main reason has to do with the quite 
different way in which services trade barriers are measured and their reform 
modelled. 
The final study reported in Table 1, WBGEP (World Bank 2002), uses the 
same 1997 GTAP data base as FMT but projects the GTAP model to 2015. With the 
world economy considerably bigger then than in 1997 or 2005 one would expect 
WBGEP to provide larger dollar estimates, other things equal. Two are provided, both 
assuming constant returns to scale and perfect competition and both with only 
merchandise trade reformed. The first estimate, which is comparable to the ADFHHM 
study, provides a global gain of $355 billion p.a. for 2015. That is in line with 
ADFHHM’s estimate of $254 billion for 2005 as both represent 0.7 percent of GDP 
for their respective years, as projected by the World Bank (2003, Table A3.1). The 
slightly larger share of that gain going to developing countries (52 percent in 2015 
compared with ADFHHM’s 43 percent) also is in line with the expected growth in 
developing countries’ share of the world economy over that decade.  
The second WBGEP estimate assumes liberalization boosts factor productivity 
in each industry according to the extent of growth in the share of production exported 
by the industry. While the precise formula used for this adjustment is somewhat 
arbitrary, it nonetheless gives a feel for how the overall size and composition across 
economies of the gains from trade can change when allowance is made for an 
openness-induced productivity boost. The case presented suggests the gains would 
rise 2.3 times to $832 billion p.a. with that adjustment,
16 and since trade of developing 
countries grows more than that of OECD countries under full liberalization, they 
receive 65 percent of those gains ($539 billion) instead of the 52 percent or $184 
billion generated without that productivity adjustment. 
In both WBGEP simulations, agriculture contributes 70 percent of the gains 
from liberalizing all merchandise trade. This is very similar to the estimate of two-
                                                 
14 The OECD defines trade facilitation as the simplification and standardization of procedures and 
associated information flows required to move products internationally from seller to buyer and to pass 
payment in the other direction. For an in-depth discussion of the nature and importance of reducing 
trading costs, see World Bank (2003, Ch. 6). Francois et al. (2003) assume full trade liberalization 
would be accompanied by a reduction in trading costs (the difference between fob and cif valuations) 
of 3 percent of the value of trade.  
15 In this study less than 4 percent of the gains from the agricultural portion of the reform is due to 
domestic agricultural support. This is consistent with other studies which also find domestic support 
measures to be a relatively minor part of agricultural assistance measures. See, for example, Hoekman, 
Ng and Olarreaga (2004) and Rae and Strutt (2003). Those findings vindicate the present paper’s focus 
on border measures. 
16 This greater gain is consistent with the consensus that has developed over the past decade that 
incorporating endogenous growth effects in CGE models raises the welfare gains from trade 
liberalization by several orders of magnitude. A recent study by Rutherford and Tarr (2002), using a 





thirds by both the ADFHHM and FMT studies.
17 The extent to which these results are 
dominated by agriculture is remarkable, given that agriculture is responsible for only 
one-twelfth of global GDP and exports. It simply reflects the fact that agricultural 
sectors of both rich and poor countries are still highly protected from import 
competition, and in some rich countries are also subsidized directly, despite the efforts 
of the Uruguay Round.
18 
By contrast to the similarity in welfare results for goods trade liberalization, 
the gain from services trade reform reported in the FMT study ($53 billion in 1997) is 
only a small fraction of the BDS estimate of $1280 billion in 2005 ($220 billion of 
which goes to developing countries). The FMT estimate is in line with an estimate by 
Verikios and Zhang (2001) of $47 billion globally just for telecom and financial 
services, while the BDS estimate of $220 billion for developing countries alone is 
exceeded by the WBGEP study which also reports an estimate of the gain from 
liberalizing services trade just for developing countries, of $884 billion in 2015. These 
vastly different results for services reflect the great deal of uncertainty that still 
prevails in estimating the extent and effects of services trade barriers (see Findlay and 
Warren 2001; Whalley 2003). Even though this is widely recognized as a major area 
of trade policy concern for both developed and developing countries, there is clearly 
much more research required in this area before we can expect a convergence of 
empirical estimates for the services sector. 
The huge estimate for gains from services reform in the BDS study appears to 
be a consequence of their model explicitly allowing for foreign investment flows, in 
contrast to the standard GTAP model where such flows play a very modest role. What 
this highlights is that trade in products need not – as suggested by the simplest of 
trade models (Mundell 1957) – be a complete substitute for trade in factors of 
production such as capital and labor. Indeed, as Markusen (1983) has shown (and see 
also Ethier 1996), factor trade can be a complement to product trade. Nor are we able 
to say a priori which might grow more when trade in all factors and products is 
opened simultaneously (Michaely 2003).  
None of the above empirical studies examines the global welfare gains from 
allowing greater international movement of labor. Historical analyses of global 
migration by Hatton and Williamson (1998, 2002) conclude that the effective demand 
by developing country workers to move to higher-income countries is likely to grow 
considerably over the next quarter century, with wage differentials a major driving 
force. It appears national governments, however, are becoming more rather than less 
restrictive of migrant inflows in the wake of that growing demand. How costly are 
such restrictions? A CGE study twenty years ago suggested complete liberalization of 
                                                 
17 By contrast, BDS estimate a share close to zero. The explanation BDS provide for this result is that 
the expanding of agriculture in lightly protecting countries draws resources from the non-agricultural 
sectors which, unlike agriculture, are assumed to have increasing returns to scale and monopolistic 
competition. Apparently that IRS/MC feature is having a much stronger effect in the BDS model than it 
is in the FMT one (which also has IRS/MC), since the FMT estimated contribution of agriculture is 
close to the estimates from the CRS/PC models. 
18 The above studies do not provide an estimate of the net welfare gains from reducing direct 
government subsidies to domestic production or consumption of non-farm products. They would be 
small compared with those from trade reform, bearing in mind that an estimated 38 percent of all 
government subsidies go to agriculture (van Beers and de Moor 2001) and hence are captured in the 
above estimates. They nonetheless represent significant transfers from taxpayers to special interest 
groups, estimated by van Beers and de Moor (2001, Table 3.1) to be $1065 billion per year globally 
between 1994 and 1998 (4 percent of GDP) and by others to be between half and twice that amount. 
Cutting those subsidies therefore has the potential to provide a great deal of revenue for meeting 





world labor markets, in the presence of existing barriers to trade in products and 
capital, could double world income and in so doing raise several-fold the economic 
welfare of people working at that time in developing countries (Hamilton and 
Whalley 1984). The more-recent resurgence of interest in this subject has encouraged 
one group of GTAP modellers to examine this issue afresh, but in the context of Mode 
4 of the WTO’s General Agreements on Trade in Services, the so-called temporary 
movement of natural persons. Winters et al. (2003) simulate the effect of raising 
worker immigration quotas of developed countries enough to increase labor forces 
there by 3 percent (which sums to a temporary migration flow from developing 
countries of 8.4 million unskilled and 8 million skilled workers or just 0.6 percent of 
the labor force in developing countries). A movement even as modest as that is 
estimated to raise annual world welfare by $156 billion (0.6 percent of global 
income), with most of that benefit accruing to those currently in developing countries 
who migrate. These welfare results underscore two points: first, migration restrictions 
are very costly to people in poor countries; and second, if rich countries are to persist 
with those restrictions in the wake of growing demands for lifting them, even more 
effort should be made to alleviate poverty through liberalizing international capital 
flows and trade in products exportable from developing countries, most notably 
agricultural goods. 
 
Implications for the Doha Round 
 
What do these results imply about the potential benefits from the WTO’s first round 
of multilateral trade negotiation round, known as the Doha Development Agenda? 
That round was originally scheduled to conclude at the end of 2004 but has been 
making slow progress, so assessing the likely benefits is difficult even though we 
know the potential benefits are those associated with full trade liberalization as 
discussed above. What needs to be kept in mind, though, is that a partial cut of, say, 
one-third across-the-board will deliver much less than one-third of the welfare gains 
shown in Table 1. The key reason for that stems from the fact that many (especially 
developing) countries have tariff bindings that are well above applied rates, 
particularly in agriculture. A cut in bound rates of, say, one-third may not deliver any 
cut at all in applied rates for some commodities.
19 This underlines the importance of 
first trying to reduce the gap between bound and applied rates. Since that gap tends to 
be larger the higher the bound tariff rate, that can happen easiest if a ‘Swiss formula’ 
is applied which reduces tariffs proportionately more the higher they are (Francois 
and Martin 2003; Fontagné, Guérin and Jean 2004).  
  Other points that need to be kept in mind when using these CGE modelling 
results include the following: 
•  the gains to developing countries enjoying tariff preferences in developed 
country markets are exaggerated if (as is the case) those preferential rates are 
not included in the models’ tariff profiles;
20 
                                                 
19 This is not to say a binding well above the applied rate has no value. As Francois and Martin (2004) 
show, for a commodity subject to domestic and/or international market fluctuations, the binding can 
cap the extent of protection in unusual years.  
20 To the extent that the gains to preference-receiving developing countries are offset by losses to other 
countries because of trade diversion, the global welfare effects of accounting for preferences (given the 
smallness of recipient economies) will be small. The GTAP Version 6 database is to include 
preferences when it is released in the fall of 2004, so future modelling studies will be able to account 





•  domestic distortionary policies and exchange rate policies, which may inhibit 
the reaping of benefits of opening up, are not all included in the models;  
•  existing but currently redundant technical barriers might cease to be redundant 
and become binding constraints to trade as tariffs fall, in which case the rate of 
protection would fall less than the applied tariff rate; and 
•  re-instrumentation of assistance to industries will reduce the gains and may 
even turn them into losses if sufficiently inferior policy instruments (e.g., new 
technical barriers to trade) replace the ones being liberalized. 
On the other hand, there are numerous reasons for believing some of the estimates in 
Table 1 may be too low, including the following: 
•  services trade reforms still need to be added to some of the modelling 
exercises, together with trade facilitation (including export tax removal), FDI 
liberalization if not also international migration; 
•  any opening up of government procurement to foreign suppliers that might 
result from the Doha round also needs to be modelled, 
•  non-agricultural subsidies (which are estimated to be around 60 percent of all 
direct government subsidies globally) are not modelled for removal in the 
reform scenarios; 
•  some of the productive factors initially absorbed to fuel reform-induced output 
growth, particularly unskilled labor, may have been previously 
underemployed; 
•  monopolistic competition and product variety/heterogeneity between firms 
still needs to be included in some of the models; 
•  price elasticities in the standard GTAP model arguably err on the low side; 
•  endogenous growth effects need to be included as a benefit; 
•  account needs to be taken of wasteful spending of resources on lobbying, as 
that will fall if assistance to industries (including re-instrumentation of 
existing protection) is announced to be a thing of the past;  
•  if trade reform encourages domestic policy and foreign exchange policy 
reforms as well, the benefits from those changes too need to be added; and, 
perhaps most important of all, 
•  the counterfactual to reform is not the status quo as assumed by modellers but 
increased protection, particularly for agriculture and conceivably also for other 
sectors without tariff bindings in place or for which technical barriers to trade 
or anti-dumping duties may then restrain trade. 
With these claims and counter-claims it is not possible to be precise about the gross 
benefits that would result from any particular reform. But consider the optimistic 
prospect of a Doha outcome involving a halving of subsidies and trade barriers. A 
lower-bound estimate of the benefit from that might be half that provided in the 
IRS/MC part of the FMT study, which is the only study to consider cuts to bound (as 
distinct from applied) tariffs. That estimate amounts to 0.67 percent of GDP in 1997. 
It contrasts with the estimate from the BDS study, in which services trade 
liberalization includes dramatic growth in foreign direct investment. Half of the 
latter’s gain from full reform amounts to 3.0 percent of GDP in 2005. If the 
comparative static gains from a 50 percent reform after full adjustment is an 
unweighted average of the BDS and FMT estimates, that would involve a boost of 1.8 
percent of GDP for the world as a whole and 2.5 percent for developing countries 





There are dynamic gains from trade to consider in addition to those 
comparative static ones (not to mention the net benefits from non-farm subsidy cuts 
and the potentially massive gains from freeing up migration). The experiences of 
successful reformers such as Korea, China, India and Chile suggest trade opening 
immediately boosts GDP growth rates by several percentage points. A conservative 
estimate therefore is that reform boosts GDP growth rates – projected to 2015 by the 
World Bank (2003, Table A3.1) to be 2.7 percent for developed countries and 4.6 
percent for developing countries – by one-sixth for developed countries and one-third 
for developing countries, that is, to 3.1 and 6.1 percent, respectively and hence from 
3.2 to 3.8 percent globally.  
 
Comparison with just removing intra-American trade barriers  
 
The negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – the largest 
such FTA negotiations currently under way – are running into political problems so it 
is not clear if/when they might conclude. It is nonetheless worth considering that 
opportunity so as to point out that the potential global gains from such an FTA are 
only a small fraction of those obtainable from multilateral negotiation. Two studies 
that examine both Doha and the FTAA are included in Table 1. The global gain from 
the FTAA in the BDS study is estimated to be just one-twenty-fifth that from a full 
multilateral trade liberalization, and for the HRTG study the difference is even 
greater. Yet another study of the FTAA, by Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic, and Keeney 
(HHIK 2003), yielded estimated gains of even less that HRTG. Furthermore, these 
studies take no account of the dampening effect of the rules of origin that almost 
invariably constrain the extent to which firms can take advantage of any FTA’s 
removal of bilateral tariffs (Krueger 1999; Anson et al. 2003); nor of the fact that such 
FTAs typically have phase-in periods that stretch more than a decade for some 
products and exclude altogether the most sensitive products.  
FTAs of this type are pursued nonetheless for a wide range of reasons, 
including preferential access to an important protected market (often at the expense of 
other countries), insurance against anti-dumping by that partner, and deeper and faster 
integration than has been possible or is in prospect through the multilateral reform 
route (Schiff and Winters 2003). The gains to just one or a few developing economies 
from joining with North America or the EU may be non-trivial, but so too would be 
the gains from a similar degree of multilateral reform. According to the HRTG study, 
a multilateral reform involving even just a 25 percent reduction in merchandise tariffs 
would benefit South America more than a 100 percent preferential tariff reform under 
the FTAA, for example.  
  Moreover, even leaving aside the potential systemic cost of FTAs on the WTO 
rules-based multilateral trading system, such preferential agreements can harm 
excluded developing and/or developed countries through trade diversion. For 
example, the estimated gains to FTAA members are nearly fully offset by losses to 
excluded economies, according to the HHIK and HRTG studies. Harmful trade 
diversion would also result from an FTA between, say, South Asia and either North 
America or the EU, according to GTAP results reported in Bandara and Yu (2003). 
Indeed a recent examination of 18 existing preferential trading arrangements found 
that 12 diverted more merchandise trade from non-members than they created among 
members (Adams et al. 2003). That review was able to conclude more positively 
about the benefits of FTAs in reforming such things as investment, services, 





benefits tend to be sufficient to offset any losses from merchandise trade diversion. 
Another recent review, by Nielsen (2003), came to similar conclusions, and added 
that the greatest gains for developing countries from FTAs would come if developed 
countries were to liberalize trade in their politically sensitive sectors, most notably 
agriculture but also textiles and clothing. That is likely in preferential agreements only 
with the smallest of developing countries whose impact on protective developed 
economies is tiny – examples of which are examined next. 
 
Comparison with just removing developed country barriers to exports from least-
developed countries 
 
The EU’s recent initiative to extend preferences for United Nations-designated ‘least 
developed countries’ (LDCs) provides duty-and quota-free access to the EU for 
exports of ‘everything but arms’ (EBA). That initiative received in-principle, best-
endeavours endorsement at the WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, but 
without any specific timetable. Liberal though that proposal sounds, note that it does 
not include trade in services (of which the most important for LDCs would be 
movement of natural persons, that is, freedom for LDC laborers to work on temporary 
visas in the EU or other high-wage countries – see Winters et al. 2003). Also, a 
number of safeguard provisions are included in addition to the EU’s normal anti-
dumping measures. Furthermore, access to three politically sensitive agricultural 
markets, bananas, rice and sugar, would be phased in by the EU only gradually over 
the rest of this decade (and would be subject to stricter safeguards).  
Several empirical studies of the proposal have already appeared. A World 
Bank study by Ianchovichina, Mattoo and Olarreaga (2001) compares the EU 
proposal, from the viewpoint of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with recent initiatives of 
the United States and Japan. Its GTAP modelling results suggest that even the most 
generous interpretation of the United States’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(which they model as unrestricted access to the US for all SSA exports) would benefit 
SSA very little because the US economy is already very open and, in the products 
where it is not (e.g. textiles and clothing), SSA countries have little comparative 
advantage. By contrast, the EU proposal, especially if it were to apply to all Quad 
countries (the EU, the US, Canada and Japan), would have a sizeable effect on SSA 
trade and welfare – provided all agricultural products are included in the deal. Just 
from EU access alone, SSA exports would be raised by more than US$0.5 billion and 
SSA economic welfare would increase by $0.3 billion per year (a 0.2 percent boost).
21 
Those results overstate the benefits of the EU proposal, however, as this World Bank 
study assumes all SSA countries (excluding relatively wealthy South Africa and 
Mauritius), not just the LDCs amongst them, would get duty- and quota-free access. 
Another World Bank study, by Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002), uses a 
partial equilibrium approach and looks at the benefit of the EU initiative for LCDs not 
just in SSA but globally. It finds that trade of LDCs would increase by US$2.5 billion 
per year if all Quad countries provided LDCs with duty- and quota-free access on all 
merchandise.
22 However, almost half of that increase would come as a result of trade 
diversion from other developing countries. The authors suggest this is trivial because 
                                                 
21 This is very similar to the estimate by UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 3). 
22 This and other estimates of gains from preferential market access provisions need to be discounted to 
the extent that such things as rules of origin, anti-dumping duties, and sanitary, phytosanitary and other 
technical barriers limit the actual trade allowed. For a detailed analysis of these types of restrictions on 





it represents less than 0.1 percent of other developing countries’ exports (about $1.1 
billion),
23 and that MFN reductions in agricultural and textile tariffs would help LDCs 
much less than it would help other developing countries. But keep in mind several 
downsides of non-reciprocal trade preference agreements that apply not just to the 
‘everything but arms’ initiative but also to the agreement the EU has had with its 
former colonies known collectively as ACP (Asia, Caribbean and Pacific) developing 
countries.  
First, other equally poor but non-LDC/non-ACP developing countries (e.g., 
Vietnam) are harmed by such preferences. This was made abundantly clear in the 
1990s during the infamous dispute-settlement case that was brought to the WTO 
concerning the EU’s banana import regime. One background study showed that for 
every dollar of benefit that the banana policy brought to producers in ACP countries, 
the regime harmed non-ACP developing country producers by almost exactly one 
dollar – and in the process harmed EU consumers by thirteen dollars (Borrell 2004). It 
is difficult to imagine a more inefficient way of transferring welfare to poor countries, 
since EU citizens could have been, through official development assistance payments, 
13 times as effective in helping ACP banana producers and not hurt non-ACP banana 
producers at all.
24 Such wasteful trade diversion is avoided under non-discriminatory 
MFN liberalizations that result from multilateral trade negotiations under WTO. 
Second, the additional production that is encouraged in those LDCs or ACP 
countries getting privileged access to the high-priced EU market is not internationally 
competitive at current prices (otherwise it would have been produced prior to getting 
that preferential treatment). Indeed the industry as a whole may not have existed in 
the LDC/ACP country had the preference scheme not been introduced.
25 In that case, 
its profits are likely to be lean despite the scheme, and would disappear if and when 
the scheme is dismantled or EU MFN tariffs are reduced. Efforts to learn the skills 
needed, and the sunk capital invested in that industry rather than in ones in which the 
country has a natural comparative advantage, would then earn no further rewards. 
Third, these preference schemes reduce very substantially the capacity for 
developing countries as a group to press for more access to developed country 
markets. When the 48 LDCs/79 ACP countries have been given such preferences, 
they become advocates for rather than against the continuation of MFN tariff peaks 
for agriculture and textiles – diminishing considerably the number of WTO members 
negotiating for their reduction. Perhaps if these schemes and the GSP had not been 
offered in the first place, developing countries would have negotiated much more 
vigorously in previous GATT rounds for lower tariffs on agricultural and other 
imports to developed countries.  
Fourth, because these preferential access schemes have not been reciprocal 
agreements (that is, the developing countries are not required to open their markets to 
developed countries’ exports) they contribute nothing to the removal of the wasteful 
                                                 
23 The impact outside the LDC group would be far from trivial for Mauritius, however, since the vast 
bulk of its exports are quota-restricted sales of clothing and sugar to the EU and US. See the discussion 
in UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 6). 
24 The EU is contemplating moving by 2006 to a tariff-only regime for banana imports from non-ACP 
countries, and in the process raising its tariff from the current 75 Euros. That could raise the protective 
effect of the tariff for ACP countries currently enjoying duty-free access, so yet again harming other 
developing countries (Borrell and Bauer 2004). 
25Alternatively, the ACP scheme may have caused an existing industry to become less competitive. An 
extreme example of an industry that has ossified as a consequence of regulations introduced to share 





trade-restrictive policies of the LDC/ACP countries. This contrasts with market access 
negotiations under WTO, which are characterized by reciprocity.
26  
Points one to three also apply to South-North reciprocal FTAs. Furthermore, 
the latter agreements are rarely just a simple sentence such as: there shall be free trade 
between the parties. On the contrary, they can run to thousands of pages involving 
long lists of exceptions, complex rules of origin and dispute settlement procedures, 
differing phase-in periods for different products, safeguard mechanisms, requirements 
to meet the trade partner’s myriad standards, and so on. So complex are such features 
that it is not uncommon for firms to pay the MFN tariff rather than do all the 
paperwork necessary to get duty-free access within an FTA. And while they are 
potentially able to deliver gains to those who join them, FTAs do so to some extent at 
the expense of excluded countries and so, as was clear from the discussion above of 
the FTAA studies, they contribute only a small fraction of the gains that can come 
from WTO-based multilateral reform – and yet they can involve major diversions of 
trade from other, lower-cost suppliers and of trade negotiator attention away from 
WTO negotiations.
27  
In any case, the more MFN tariffs are reduced the less need there is for 
preferential trade agreements; and gains to consumers in the preference-providing 
countries from their MFN liberalizations would be more than sufficient to allow them 
to increase their aid to LDCs to compensate many times over for the loss of LDC 
income from the preference erosion that necessarily accompanies MFN reform.  
 
 
Economic Costs of Trade Reform 
 
The above benefits from reform are not costless of course. Expenditure on 
negotiating, and on supporting policy think tanks and the like to develop and 
disseminate a convincing case for reform, would be needed. But more significant in 
many people’s eyes are the private costs of adjustment for firms and workers, as 
reform forces some industries to downsize or close to allow others to expand (Matusz 
and Tarr 2000; Francois 2003). Those costs are ignored in the full-employment CGE 
models discussed above. There are also social costs to consider. They include social 
safety net provisions in so far as such schemes are developed/drawn on by losers from 
reform (e.g., unemployment payments plus training grants to build up new skills so 
displaced workers can earn the same wage as before), and perhaps increased costs of 
crime in so far as its incidence rises with transitional unemployment.  
Those one-off costs, which need to be weighed against the non-stop flow of 
economic benefits from reform, tend to be smaller, the longer the phase-in period or 
smaller the tariff or subsidy cut per year (Furusawa and Lai 1999).
28 They also are 
minor relative to the benefits from reform. An early study by Magee (1972) for the 
United States estimated the cost of job changes including temporary unemployment to 
be no more than one-eighth of the initial benefits from tariff and quota elimination. 
                                                 
26 These criticisms are not new. Most were foreshadowed by Patterson (1965) when the preferences 
were first mooted by Prebisch and Singer. 
27 They can also reduce welfare in the partner developed country through trade diversion, as was shown  
using CGE analysis as long ago as the 1980s (Brown 1987, 1989). 
28 The adjustment required also tends to be small when compared with the changes due to exchange 
rate fluctuations, technological improvements, preference shifts and other economic shocks and 
structural developments associated with normal economic growth (Anderson et al. 1997; Dixon, 





Even assuming that transition took as many as five years, he estimated a benefit/cost 
ratio of 25. A subsequent study which examined a 50 percent cut in US tariffs (but not 
quotas) came up with a similar benefit/cost estimate (Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson 
1980). In more recent debates about trade and labor, analysts have not found a 
significant link between import expansion and increased unemployment (see 
Greenaway and Nelson 2002). One example is a study of the four largest EU 
economies’ imports from East Asia (Bentivogli and Pagano 1999). Another is a study 
of the UK footwear industry which found liberalizing that market would incur 
unemployment costs only in the first year, because of the high job turnover in that 
industry, and they were less than 1.5 percent of the estimated benefits from cutting 
that protection (Winters and Takacs 1991). A similar-sized estimate is provided by de 
Melo and Tarr (1990) using a CGE model that focuses just on US textile, steel and 
auto protection cuts and drawing on estimates of the cost of earnings lost by displaced 
workers (later reported by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993).  
For developing countries also the evidence seems to suggest low costs of 
adjustment, not least because trade reform typically causes a growth spurt (Krueger 
1983). In a study of 13 liberalization efforts for nine developing countries, Michaely 
et al. (1991) found only one example where employment was not higher within a year. 
A similar study for Mauritius by Milner and Wright (1998) also found trade opening 
to be associated with employment growth rather than decline. A survey of 18 Latin 
American countries for the period 1970 to 1996, by Marquez and Pages (1998), found 
some increases in short-term unemployment, but mainly in countries where the real 
exchange rate appreciated as a result of capital inflows that had accompanied the 
reforms. That small short-term negative effect soon reversed as production became 
more labour intensive following reform, according to studies by Moreira and Najberg 
(2000) for Brazil and de Ferranti et al. (2001) for a wide range of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries over the 1990s.  
A further impact of trade policy reform about which concern is often 
expressed is the loss of tariff revenue for the government. This is of trivial importance 
to developed and upper middle-income countries where trade taxes account for only 1 
and 3 percent of government revenue, respectively. For lower middle-income 
countries that share is 9 percent, and it is more than 20 percent for more than a dozen 
low-income countries for which data are available. How concerned should those 
poorer countries be? The answer depends on whether/how much that revenue would 
fall and, if it does fall, on whether/how much more costly would be the next best 
alternative means of raising government revenue. On the first of those two points, 
government revenue from import taxes will rise rather than fall with reform if the 
reform involves replacing, with less-prohibitive tariffs, any of import quotas or bans, 
or tariffs that are prohibitive (or nearly so) or which encourage smuggling or under-
invoicing or corruption by customs officials. It is possible even in a tariff-only regime 
that lower tariffs lead to a sufficiently higher volume and value of trade that the 
aggregate tariff collection rises. Examples of recent trade policy reforms that led to 
increased tariff revenue are Chile and Mexico (Bacchetta and Jansen 2003, p. 15) and 
Kenya (Glenday 2000).
29 Since the economy is enlarged by opening up, income and 
consumption tax collections will automatically rise too. On the second point, about 
the cost of raising government revenue by other means if tax revenue does fall, 
Corden (1997, Ch. 4) makes it clear that in all but the poorest of countries it will be 
more rather than less efficient to collect tax revenue in other ways. Even countries as 
                                                 





poor as Cambodia have managed to introduce a value added tax. Hence from a global 
viewpoint there is no significant cost that needs to be included in response to this 
concern. To the extent subsidies are also cut as part of the reform, the chances of 
government revenue rising are even greater. Income and consumption tax revenue 
also will rise as the economy expands following reform. In any case CGE modellers 
typically alter those other tax rates when trade tax revenues change so as to keep the 
overall government budget unchanged. 
 
 
Impacts of Reform on Poverty and the Environment 
 
Because trade reform generates large and on-going economic gains while incurring 
comparatively minor one-off adjustment costs, it would allow individuals and 
governments to spend more on other pressing problems, thereby indirectly 
contributing to the alleviation of other challenges facing society. But in addition, trade 
reform would also directly alleviate some of those challenges. By way of illustration, 
consider the impact of trade reform on poverty alleviation (since that is the solution to 
many of the world’s problems) and then on the environment. 
 
Poverty alleviation  
 
Evidence presented by Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002) among 
others suggests aggregate economic growth differences have been largely responsible 
for the differences in poverty alleviation across regions. Initiatives that boost 
economic growth are therefore likely to be helpful in the fight against poverty, and 
trade liberalization is such an initiative. But cuts to subsidies and trade barriers also 
alter relative product prices domestically and in international markets, which in turn 
affect factor prices. Hence the net effect on poverty depends also on the way those 
price changes affect poor households’ expenditure and their earnings net of 
remittances. If the consumer and producer price changes (whether due to own-country 
reforms and/or those of other countries) harm the poor, it is then an empirical question 
as to whether the generic effects of reform on economic growth are sufficient to more 
than offset those adverse price changes. But if those price changes are pro-poor, then 
they will reinforce the growth effects of trade reform on the poor. 
The effects on global poverty can be thought of at three levels: on the income 
gap between the developed and developing country groups, on different types of 
developing countries, and on poor households within those different types of 
countries. On the first, the current developing countries, which produced just 19 
percent of global GDP in 2002, would enjoy nearly half of the net present value of the 
global static plus dynamic gains from halving trade barriers, according to the above 
survey of CGE estimates. Clearly that would reduce substantially the income gap 
between developed and developing countries on average.  
Leaving aside the potential growth effects, comparative static welfare effects 
of reform-induced price changes on different developing countries are provided by 
Anderson et al. (2001, Table 4). All major developing countries gain except China 
(where the terms of trade effect of expanding its exports of light manufactures 
dominates), as do all the other regions of smaller economies other than North Africa 
and the Middle East (where the terms of trade loss from rising international food 
prices is large). Among the smaller developing countries there may be some 





market whose loss from preference erosion exceeds the gain from reducing own-
country distortions.
30 Food-importing developing countries also could be harmed from 
an increase in the relative price of food in international markets. Even in these cases, 
losses are likely only where own-country reform is so modest that the gain in 
efficiency of resource allocation from own-country reform is insufficient to 
compensate for the adverse terms of trade change. A new preliminary study using the 
pre-release Version 6 of the GTAP database that includes tariff preferences finds that 
Sub-Saharan Africa could indeed lose slightly from the Doha round, but only if that 
region undertakes little trade reform itself (Achterbosch, Ben Hannouda, Osakwe and 
van Tongeren 2004). The region would be even less likely to lose if the export taxes 
still in place there (see Thiele 2003) were also to be removed. 
Note that it is not necessarily the case that a country that is currently a net food 
importer will lose from a rise in the international price of food, ceteris paribus. If, for 
example, the country is close to self-sufficient in food without price supports, and 
reform abroad raises the price of its food exports, it may switch to become sufficiently 
export-oriented that its net national economic welfare rises.
31 A second possibility is 
that a developing country's own policies are sufficiently biased against food 
production that the country is a net importer, despite having a comparative advantage 
in food. In that case, it has been shown that the international price rise can improve 
national economic welfare, even if the price changes and its own partial reform are 
not sufficient to turn that distorted economy into a net food exporter (Anderson and 
Tyers 1993). That comes about because the higher price of food attracts mobile 
resources away from more-distorted sectors, thereby improving the efficiency of 
national resource allocation. Because of these two possibilities, the number of poor 
countries for whom a rise in international food prices might cause some hardship is 
(possibly much) smaller than the number that are currently net importers of food 
products. 
How poor households within developing countries are affected is more 
difficult to say (Winters 2002; McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 2001). What is clear 
from Table 2 is that the agricultural policies of developed countries provide a major 
source of developing country gains from reform, and lowering barriers to textiles and 
clothing trade also is important. Both would boost the demand for unskilled labor and 
for farm products produced in poor countries, with the possible exception of those 
countries that would suffer most from preference erosion. Since two-thirds of the 
world’s poor live in rural areas and, in least-developed countries, the proportion is as 
high as 90 percent (OECD 2003a, p. 3), and since most poor rural households are net 
sellers of farm labor and/or food, one would expect such reforms to reduce the 
number in absolute poverty (Anderson 2004; Cline 2004a). A preliminary analysis by 
Hertel, Ivanic, Perckel and Cranfield (2003), in which GTAP results are carefully 
                                                 
30 They were not able to be captured in that study not only because of insufficient disaggregation by 
country but also because LDC preferences were not available for inclusion in the GTAP model’s 
Version 5 database. It needs to be kept in mind, though, that the preference margin is often eroded by 
complex rules of origin, and the residual is shared between importing and exporting countries with the 
latter getting less, the more trade is concentrated on standard commodities (Olarreaga and Ozden 2004, 
Ozden and Sharma 2004). A recent partial equilibrium study found that in practice export revenue 
losses from preference erosion are likely to be limited to a small subset of countries, primarily small 
island economies dependent on exports of sugar, bananas and, to a far lesser extent, textiles 
(Alexandraki and Lankes 2004). 
31 This case would not apply to a country eligible for preferential access to the protected EU food 
market, because if that country was unable to export profitably before the EU protection cut it would 





combined with household income and expenditure survey data for 14 developing 




The natural environment  
 
The effects of trade reform on the environment have been the focus of much 
theoretical and empirical analysis since the 1970s and especially in the past dozen or 
so years (Anderson and Blackhurst 2002; Beghin, van der Mennsbrugghe and Roland-
Holst 2002; Copland and Taylor 2003). Until recently environmentalists have tended 
to focus mainly on the direct environmental costs they perceive from trade reform, 
just as they have with other areas of economic change. That approach does not 
acknowledge areas where the environment might have been improved, albeit 
indirectly, as a result of trade reform (e.g., from less production by pollutive 
industries that were previously protected). Nor does it weigh the costs of any net 
worsening of the environment against the economic benefits of policy reform of the 
sort described above. The reality is that the environmental effects of reform will differ 
across sectors and regions of the world, some positive and some negative. 
Having said that, there are many examples where cuts to subsidies and trade 
barriers would reduce environmental damage (Anderson 1992; Irwin 2002, pp. 48-
54). For some time the OECD has been analysing these opportunities (OECD 1996, 
1997, 1998, 2003b). Environmental NGOs too are increasingly recognising them, 
with Greenpeace currently focusing on energy subsidies, WWF on fisheries subsidies 
(WWF 2001), and IISD and Friends of the Earth on subsidy reforms generally (e.g, 
Myers and Kent 1998; FOE et al. 2003). They and the better-informed development 
NGOs such as Oxfam are coming to the view that the net social and environmental 
benefits from reducing subsidies and at least some trade barriers may indeed be 
positive rather than negative, and that the best hope of reducing environmentally 
harmful subsidies and trade barriers is via the WTO’s multi-issue, multilateral trade 
negotiations process. 
If there remains a concern that the net effect of trade reform on the 
environment may be negative nationally or globally, that should be a stimulus to 
check whether first-best environmental policy measures are in place and set at the 
optimal level of intervention, rather than a reason for not reducing trade distortions. 
This is because if they are so set, we would then know that the direct economic gains 
from opening to trade would exceed society’s evaluation of any extra environmental 
damage, other things equal (Corden 1997, Ch. 13).  
Estimating the global cost to society of all environmental damage that might 
accompany a reduction in subsidies and trade barriers, net of all environmental gains, 
is extraordinarily difficult both conceptually and empirically.
33 But much 
environmental damage in developing countries is a direct consequence of poverty 
                                                 
32 The interesting exception is Mexico: poverty there has been reduced by Mexico’s preferential access 
into the US market via NAFTA, and the benefit of those preferences would decrease with multilateral 
reform because Mexico would then have to share some of those earlier gains with other developing 
countries. This result highlights the beggar-thy-neighbour nature of FTAs, as discussed earlier. 
33 A beginning nonetheless is being made, with several governments funding ex ante evaluations of the 
WTO Doha round’s potential impact on the environment. The EU’s efforts include a workshop on 
methodological issues which are laid out in CEPII (2003), and further work has been contracted to the 
University of Manchester whose progress can be traced at http://idpm.man.ac.uk/sia-
trade/Consultation.htm. Ex post analyses are also being undertaken by NGOs. See, for example, 





(e.g., the slash-and-burn shifting agriculture of landless unemployed squatters). In so 
far as trade reform reduces poverty, so it will reduce such damage. More generally, 
the relationships between per capita income and a wide range of environmental 
indicators have been studied extensively. Because richer people have a greater 
demand for a clean environment, income rises tend to be associated with better 
environmental outcomes once incomes rise above certain levels.
34 Even though more 
pollutive products are being consumed as incomes rise, many abatement practices 
have been spreading fast enough to more than compensate. And openness to trade 
accelerates that spread of abatement ideas and technologies, making their 
implementation in developing countries affordable at ever-earlier stages of 
development. 
When the environmental impact is global rather than local, as with greenhouse 
gases and their alleged impact on climate change, international environmental 
agreements may be required (see Cline 2004b). When developing countries are not 
party to such agreements, however, it is difficult to prevent ‘leakage’ through a re-
location of carbon-intensive activities to those non-signatories. An alternative or 
supplementary approach that is likely to achieve at least some emission reductions, 
and at the same time generate national and global economic benefits rather than costs, 
involves lowering coal subsidies and trade barriers. Past coal policies have 
encouraged excessive production of coal in a number of industrial countries and 
excessive coal consumption in numerous developing countries including transition 
economies. Phasing out those distortionary policies has both improved the economy 
and lowered greenhouse gas emissions globally – a ‘no regrets’ outcome or win-win 
Pareto improvement for the economy and the environment (Anderson and McKibbin 
2000). Additional opportunities for reducing greenhouse gases through cutting energy 






Notwithstanding the progress over the past two decades in opening up national 
economies, including key developing countries, much remains to be gained from 
further trade reform. The estimated net benefit to developing countries that would 
flow from adjusting to greater access to developed country markets is large compared 
with official development assistance currently provided by OECD countries to 
developing countries (around $60 billion per year). It is large also compared with the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) funds that flow from OECD to developing countries 
(between $120 and $150 billion per year). Yet it would not be costly for developed 
countries to provide that greater market access. On the contrary, those countries 
would gain even more in dollar terms than developing countries from such policy 
reform (see Table 2), giving them extra resources to expand their development 
assistance and FDI and thereby further reduce global income inequality and poverty. 
And if developing countries were to reduce their own trade barriers as well, they 
would gain even more – both from removing their own distortionary policies, and 
                                                 
34 This is the theme of the recent book by Hollander (2003). For statistical evidence of the extent to 
which different environmental indicators first worsen and then improve as incomes rise (sometimes 
called the environmental Kuznets curve), see the special issue of the journal Environment and 
Development Economics, Volume 2, Issue 4 in 1997 and the more-recent papers by and cited in 





because of greater growth in their trade with other developing countries. What is 
required is bold leadership to grasp the opportunities for unilateral and multilateral 
trade reform and associated subsidy cuts, particularly now that the WTO’s Doha 
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